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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model which identiﬁes four channels—import prices,
competition with domestic suppliers and workers, and commodity prices—through which price-
and wage-setting conditions in country j may affect inﬂation in country i. We estimate a dynamic
inﬂation equation derived from the theoretical model using a quarterly dataset of eighteen OECD
countries over the 1984-2006 period. Although our methodology can be applied to any pair of
countries, we focus on the effect of China on the inﬂation rate of other countries. Our results
suggest that while China’s negative effect on global inﬂation has been quantitatively modest, it
has increased in absolute terms since the early 2000s. We also ﬁnd evidence that, for most
countries examined, competition with domestic suppliers has been the most important channel.
JEL classiﬁcation: E22, E32, E44
Bank classiﬁcation: International topics
Résumé
Les auteurs élaborent un modèle théorique faisant intervenir quatre canaux (prix à l’importation,
concurrence livrée aux fournisseurs et aux travailleurs nationaux et prix des produits de base) par
lesquels les conditions d’établissement des prix et des salaires dans le pays j peuvent inﬂuer sur
l’inﬂation dans le pays i. À l’aide de données trimestrielles se rapportant à 18 pays membres de
l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques et couvrant la période 1984-
2006, ils estiment une équation d’inﬂation dynamique inspirée du modèle théorique. Bien que
leur méthodologie puisse être appliquée à n’importe quelle paire de pays, les auteurs examinent
surtout l’effet de l’émergence de la Chine sur le taux d’inﬂation des autres pays. Leurs résultats
indiquent que, si les retombées négatives de l’essor de l’économie chinoise sur l’inﬂation
mondiale sont modestes en termes quantitatifs, elles ont toutefois augmenté en valeur absolue
depuis le début des années 2000. Ils constatent également que, dans la plupart des pays examinés,
la concurrence livrée aux fournisseurs nationaux constitue le plus important des canaux étudiés.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E22, E32, E44
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, we aim to identify the channels of transmission − based on
the direct eﬀect of import prices, competition with domestic suppliers and workers, and commodity
prices − through which price-and-wage-setting conditions in country j may aﬀect the inﬂation rate
of country i. Second, controlling for the monetary policy framework, we isolate and quantify the
eﬀect of China on global inﬂation according to these channels by estimating a dynamic inﬂation
equation.
World inﬂation has fallen from nearly 30 per cent in 1990 to less than 4 per cent in 2005 (Table
1).1 Inﬂation has fallen in developed and developing countries, from 5.4 to 2.3 per cent, and from
76.8 to 5.1 per cent, respectively. Sharp reductions have been observed in Asia and Africa, with
even more dramatic declines in Latin America and emerging economies in Europe.
Year World Developed Developing Asia Africa Latin America Emerging Europe
1990 29.3 5.4 76.8 6.5 17.4 1293.8 162.0
1995 15.3 2.4 33.4 11.8 32.7 22.4 120.7
2000 4.4 2.4 6.8 1.5 11.5 12.6 25.3
2005 3.6 2.3 5.1 3.5 6.2 6.6 8.5
Source: International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Table 1
Inflation (% per year)
The widely accepted view is that inﬂation is a monetary phenomenon (McCandless and Weber
1995), ultimately determined in the long run by monetary policy (Ball 2006). This suggests that
institutional changes leading to better monetary policy frameworks may be the main explanation for
the world-wide decline in inﬂation over the past decade. For instance, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006)
suggest that greater central bank independence accounts for about two-thirds of lower inﬂation
outcomes among developed economies over the past two decades. Vega and Winkelried (2005)
show that the adoption of inﬂation-targeting regimes has signiﬁcantly reduced the mean inﬂation
rate in a sample of developed and developing economies.
While inﬂation may be a monetary phenomenon in the long run, demand and supply shocks can
aﬀect inﬂation in the short run for at least three reasons. First, it takes time for central banks
to identify and respond to shocks. Second, they may follow a strategy known as “opportunistic
disinﬂation” (Bomﬁm and Rudebusch 2000, and Orphanides and Wilcox 2002) and decide not to
completely oﬀset certain types of favourable supply shocks (e.g., reductions in the relative price of
imports). Third, even when central banks do react, the presence of nominal and real rigidities in
1The data are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). See Appendix A for a detailed description of the data used in this paper.
1the economy may delay the full materialization of these eﬀects.2 Additional factors may also help
explain changes in the short-run inﬂation dynamics in recent years. Rogoﬀ (2003) suggests, for
instance, higher productivity growth, increased competition resulting from deregulation, reduced
government size, and more importantly, globalization.
Globalization, deﬁned as the economic integration of national markets in goods, services, labour,
and capital, has intensiﬁed since the early 2000s (Frankel 2006). Indeed, average trade ﬂows (the
sum of exports and imports) as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) have increased from 13
per cent in 1980 to 29 per cent in 2000, accelerated thereafter, and reached 42 per cent in 2006
(Figure 1).3 As a result, policy makers have been increasingly interested in the potential connection
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Figure 1
To the extent that globalization brings about a continuous entry of lower-cost producers from
emerging-market countries into the global trading system, this implies reduced market power for
domestic producers (Bernanke 2007) and acts as a tailwind for central banks’ eﬀorts to lower
inﬂation. If that is the case, monetary policy risks being too restrictive (expansive) if the duration
and magnitude of the tailwind are under(over)estimated (Fischer 2006).4
Recently, a number of papers have examined the relationship between globalization and inﬂation in
developed countries, using a reduced-form Phillips curve framework. For instance, panel and single-
2Monetary policy stance also has a role in the short-run dynamics of inﬂation. To the extent that agents perceive
the central bank as being more aggressive in reacting to inﬂationary shocks, inﬂation expectations become better
anchored over time, and actual inﬂation can be brought back to its long-run objective more quickly.
3Based on data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) compiled by the IMF for a sample of 25 countries
that account for 70 per cent of world GDP.
4Rogoﬀ (2003) also proposes that globalization implies more ﬂexible prices and a steeper Phillips curve. With less
incentives to stimulate the real economy through higher unexpected inﬂation, central banks become more credible in
keeping inﬂation low, which in turn reduces the cost of actually doing it, and leads to lower long-term inﬂation rates.
This channel does not seem to be supported by most empirical studies.
2equation estimations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2006) suggest that globalization
reduced average inﬂa t i o nb ya b o u t0.1 of a percentage point per year over the 1960-2004 period.
Borio and Filardo (2007) ﬁnd that foreign output gaps add signiﬁcant explanatory power to “globe-
centric” versions of a Phillips curve over the 1985Q1-2005Q4 period. Using the same basic approach
as Borio and Filardo, but with diﬀerent equation speciﬁcations and alternative deﬁnitions of the
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Figure 2
In this paper, we follow a similar approach − the estimation of dynamic equations for the inﬂation
process − to investigate the globalization and inﬂation hypothesis, but we focus on the role played
by one particular low-cost emerging-market economy: China. The emphasis on China is motivated
by its strong export (Figure 2) and GDP growth over the past two decades, leading to a sharp
increase in China’s share of the world economy (Figure 3).5
5World GDP in Figure 3 is based on IFS/IMF data for the same twenty-ﬁv ec o u n t r i e su s e dt og e n e r a t eF i g u r e1( s e e
Footnote 3). They also include the eighteen countries − all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) − d i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e2 .
3Over the past few years, a number of studies have investigated whether increased integration of
China into the global economy has contributed to lower inﬂation rates in other countries. Taken
as a whole, these studies suggest that the eﬀect of China, while non-negligible, is quantitatively
modest. For instance, Morel (2007) ﬁnds that cheaper goods imports from China have reduced
Canadian CPI inﬂation by about 0.1 of a percentage point, on average, over the 2001−2006 period.
Using a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis, Kumar et. al (2003) ﬁnd that price ﬂuctuations in
China have a moderate impact on inﬂation in a few Asian countries, but a small impact on inﬂation
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, over the 1993−2002 period. Their study also
suggests that the eﬀect of China appears to have risen over time. Feyzioglu and Willard (2006),
using cointegration techniques and impulse-response functions over the 1984Q1−2005Q2 period,
ﬁnd limited evidence that inﬂa t i o ni nC h i n ah a da ne ﬀect on the inﬂation rate of the United
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Figure 3
Kamin, Marazzi, and Schindler (2006) estimate that imports from China may have lowered U.S.
import price inﬂation by about 0.8 of a percentage point annually, over the past decade. This
would imply a reduction of about 0.1 of a percentage point or less on CPI inﬂation, given the
share of merchandise imports in U.S. consumption. In addition, using trade ﬂows of twenty-six
economies, all members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
they suggest that Chinese exports lowered annual import price inﬂation by 0.25 of a percentage
point or less, on average, since 1993. However, they only investigate the role of import prices as
the channel of transmission of disinﬂationary pressures coming from China.
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model which identiﬁes four channels through which glob-
alization in general, and China in particular, may aﬀect inﬂa t i o ni nag i v e nc o u n t r y . F i r s t ,t h e
4“supply-side direct eﬀect” accounts for the direct eﬀect of imported goods prices into the domestic
consumption basket. Second, the “supply-side indirect eﬀect” captures the competitive pressures
coming from two channels: (i) the increased availability of foreign goods that induces a more elas-
tic world demand, which, in turn, reduces the market power of domestic ﬁrms, thus aﬀecting their
price-setting decisions (the Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP, channel); and (ii) the higher integra-
tion of labour markets which reduces the bargaining power of workers and, potentially, labour-cost
growth in other parts of the world (the labour-cost channel). Fourth, the “demand-side indirect ef-
fect” which measures the eﬀect of global demand and its consequences for domestic CPI inﬂation −
directly, as demand shocks in domestic Phillips curves, and indirectly, through its eﬀect on world oil
and non-oil commodities prices. While previous studies have assessed either the supply-side direct
eﬀect or the total eﬀect of price-setting conditions in China on the inﬂation rate of other countries,
to our knowledge, no studies have yet been published that account for these four channels.
Using a quarterly dataset for a selection of eighteen OECD countries, we estimate both country-
speciﬁc and panel versions of the dynamic inﬂation equation derived from the theoretical model.
The estimation results are used in a counterfactual exercise to compute time-varying eﬀects of
China on the CPI inﬂation of other countries. We ﬁnd that while China’s negative eﬀect on global
inﬂation has been quantitatively modest, it has increased in absolute terms since the early 2000s.
In addition, we provide evidence that, for most countries examined, competition with domestic
suppliers has been the most important channel.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model for a dynamic inﬂation
equation which accounts for the four channels discussed above. Section 3 presents the reduced-form
equation used to estimate the eﬀect of price-and-wage-setting conditions in country j on the inﬂation
rate of country i. Section 4 discusses the estimation results while Section 5 provides estimates of
the eﬀect that China exerts on the inﬂation rate of eighteen OECD countries accounting for the
four channels described above. Section 6 concludes and suggests paths for future research.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a theoretical model for the dynamic process of inﬂation. As it is
usually emphasized in the literature on globalization and inﬂation, we acknowledge that inﬂation is
ultimately a function of a country’s monetary policy framework. Accordingly, the following analysis
must be interpreted as being conditional on this framework.6
Let the consumer price index (CPI) in country i be a composite of price indices for tradable and
nontradable goods, and let α ∈ [0,1] be the weight of tradable goods in the CPI basket. The
6As presented in Section 3, the eﬀect of monetary policy is controlled for in the econometric exercise.







t(N) are the inﬂation rates of tradable and nontradable goods in country i,
respectively.
In the following subsections, we introduce the four channels through which wage and price inﬂation
in country j may aﬀect the inﬂation rate of country i.
2.1 The Supply-Side Direct Eﬀect
Tradable goods in the CPI basket can be either domestically produced or imported. Let πi
t(Td)
and πi
t (M) denote the inﬂation rates of domestically produced and imported goods, respectively.
Furthermore, let β be the share of domestically produced tradable goods in πi






Let J be a set of countries. For country i ∈ J, assume the foreign component of the inﬂation of
tradable goods is a weighted average of the inﬂation rate of tradable goods in all trade-partner
countries j ∈ J − {i}, denoted π
j
t(T), plus the growth rate of the bilateral nominal exchange rate,
e
ij
















Note that the contribution of each country j to πi
t (M) is weighted by the share of country i’s total



















We refer to the impact of price-setting conditions in country j on πi
t(T), through πi
t (M),a st h e
supply-side direct eﬀect.
2.2 The Supply-Side Indirect Eﬀect
The supply-side indirect eﬀect of country j on the inﬂation rate of country i reﬂects two competition
channels which are likely to be stronger the more open country i is to bilateral trade with country
j, and the more integrated country i is with the world economy.
7Let E
ij
t be the (level of the) bilateral nominal exchange rate, deﬁned in units of local (country i’s) currency


















6First, competitive pressures from goods produced in country j may prevent ﬁrms in the tradable
sector of country i from increasing prices during booms.8 In other words, exposure to foreign goods
may lead to more “contestable” domestic markets by lowering the monopoly power of domestic
ﬁrms. The eﬀect of world competition on the prices of goods in country i can be roughly summarized
by the traditional Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) condition. We assume that the PPP condition
holds, although less than perfectly, as the price-setting mechanism for a proportion λ of domestic
producers of tradable goods that are assumed to be price-takers.
Second, as domestic markets integrate into the world economy, pressure from low-wage foreign
labour markets will begin to erode the bargaining power of domestic workers, thereby reducing (the
growth rate of) labour costs in country i. This mechanism, likely to be of second-order importance
for price-takers, may be relevant for the remaining share (1 − λ) of tradable goods producers in
country i that set their prices in a monopolistically competitive environment according to demand
and supply conditions. In the next two subsections, we describe these channels in more detail.
2.2.1 The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Channel
To study the eﬀects of international competition on the domestic market for goods, let πi
t(Td
λ) be the
inﬂation rate of tradable goods that are domestically produced by price-taker ﬁrms (a proportion
λ of domestic ﬁrms) and priced according to the “Law of One Price” or Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) rule.
We consider competition eﬀects coming from two sources. The ﬁrst eﬀect is speciﬁct ob i l a t -




λ) be the part of πi
t(Td
λ) associated with this direct, bilateral eﬀect. We approximate the

















t ∈ [0,µ max] is a measure of bilateral trade openness between countries i and j, introduced


















t i st h es a m ea si n( 4 ) ,X
ij
t is country i’s exports to country j,a n dY i
t is a measure of
country i’s domestic output, such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
8Similarly, during recessions, the potential additional sales to foreign customers within a more integrated market
may reduce pressures for price reductions.
7The second competition eﬀect, rather than being speciﬁct o(i,j)−bilateral trade, comes from
global trade. For instance, if countries i and j are completely closed to bilateral trade but continue
to trade with the rest of the world, competitive pressures coming from country j may still reach
country i through competition in a third (common) market, provided that j is big enough. Let
πi
t(G) be the part of πt(Td
λ) due to indirect competition in third markets. Accordingly, the overall
(average) PPP condition is approximated by:
πi
t(G)=Gt [et + π∗
t], (7)
where Gt ∈ [0,G max] reﬂects aggregate, common restrictions to global trade such as set-backs in
multilateral agreements. Taking the rest of the world as a reference, et and π∗
t are average measures
of the rate of (nominal) depreciation of the exchange rate and foreign inﬂation, respectively.
Using θ
ij
t as weights to compute et + π∗




The restrictions to global trade are captured by the following measure of globalization, which is a
weighted average of trade ﬂows (sum of total imports, M
j
t , and total exports, X
j
t) as a proportion















































where ζ and γ are sensitivity parameters that determine the relative importance of the direct
(bilateral) and indirect (globalization) competition channels on πi
t(TD
λ ), respectively.


























8Note that a lack of bilateral trade between i and j (i.e., µ
ij
t =0 ) implies that competition coming





λ). Similarly, with no integration in global markets
(i.e., Gt =0 ), competition in third markets do not aﬀect πi
t(Td






λ),a st h esupply-side indirect eﬀect of country j on the inﬂation of country i
due to the PPP channel.
2.2.2 The Labour-Cost Channel
In this section, we turn to the eﬀects of international competition on labour markets. Recall that,
rather than being price-takers, a proportion (1 − λ) of domestic ﬁrms in country i’s tradable goods
sector set their prices, denoted pi
t(Td
1−λ), in a monopolistically competitive environment. Assuming
that these ﬁrms face a negatively sloped Dixit-Stiglitz demand function and generate output from
labour inputs according to a linear production function, proﬁt maximization requires the familiar

















wage rate and Ai
t(Td) is productivity in the tradable goods sector in country i.9
By taking natural logs on both sides and diﬀerentiating with respect to time, a dynamic version of








t(Td) are the growth rates of nominal wages and productivity, respectively.
Assume that a fraction η of workers in the tradable sector set their wages according to the aver-
age domestic wage rate, while (1 − η) are exposed to international competition. Wages aﬀected
by international competition grow according to a function of foreign wage inﬂation converted to
domestic currency. The wage setting conditions in the tradable sector are then expressed as:
wi
t(Td)=ηwi





































(average) industry-level price and output (demand), respectively.





































t) is a proxy for job market integration between i and j,w h i c hw i l lﬁlter
the eﬀect of the competition of country j’s wages on country i’s wages.10 Parameter ς determines the
sensitivity of domestic wage inﬂation in the tradable goods sector to international labour markets.
In addition, assume that productivity growth in the tradable sector is proportional to the overall




To obtain a dynamic link between the growth rate of unit labour costs in trade-partner country j




















1−λ),a st h esupply-side indirect eﬀect of country
j on the inﬂation of country i due to the labour-cost channel.
2.3 The Demand-Side Eﬀect
The demand-side eﬀect of country j on the inﬂation of country i is discussed in this subsection. We
consider two separate channels. First, a foreign country j may exert a direct demand-pull eﬀect on
domestic activity in country i. Second, demand pressures coming from country j may aﬀect world
prices of oil and non-oil commodities, and indirectly translate into additional cost-push factors
relevant for country i.11
As suggested by Borio and Filardo (2007), measures of economic slack based only on domestic
variables (i.e., domestic output gap) may no longer be suﬃcient, or even relevant, to assess potential
demand pressures believed to aﬀect inﬂation. They suggest that, given the increasing integration
of national markets, foreign output gaps may also play a role as an indicator of slackness. To take
that into account, we assume the economy may be hit by demand shocks,  D
t , which are in part
explained by current and past values of foreign output gaps, b ut, as well as by an exogenous process,
εD











t maybe an imperfect measure of job market integration, there are two main motivations for its use.
First, in terms of data availability, given the 25 countries in our sample, it is more readily available than measures
such as bilateral immigration ﬂows, for example. Second, from a theoretical perspective, the Theorem of Factor Price
Equalization (for a rigorous mathematical proof and critical discussion, see Dixit and Norman 1980) provides a link
between trade and equalization of wage rates (which can be a measure of job market integration) even in the absence
of labour mobility.
11Morrison and Swann (2003) and Kilman (2003) are among the studies suggesting that China’s growing demand
for raw materials used in expanding its infrastructure and manufacturing capacity has exerted upward pressure on
the prices of many key commodities.
10where b ut is deﬁned as a weighted-average percentage deviation of GDP from its trend, using as









On the supply-side, assume the economy faces cost—push shocks,  S
t .W e m o d e l  S
t as a function
of current and lagged growth rates of world oil prices and non-oil commodity prices − πt(oil),a n d





















t ∼ N (0,σS) is an exogenous process.
Oil and non-oil commodity prices are determined in world markets. Let g∗
t b et h eg r o w t hr a t eo f
the world economy, as measured by a weighted cross-country average of GDP.12 We assume that
πt(oil) and πt(com) are linear functions of their own lagged values plus current and lagged values
of both b ut and g∗
t.T h eﬁrst captures the (transitory) eﬀects of “global excess demand,” and the
latter is associated with more permanent eﬀects of world trend growth. The following equations






































The demand-side eﬀect of country j c a nt h e nb ed e t e r m i n e db yi t sc o n t r i b u t i o nt ob ut,w h i c hi n
turn will aﬀect  D
t (directly) and  S
t (indirectly, through πoil
t and πcom
t ).
2.4 A Dynamic Equation for Inﬂation
In this section, we complete our description of CPI inﬂation. We need an expression for the
inﬂation of tradable goods. Note that the proportions of price-takers and price-setters among




λ )+( 1− λ)πi
t(TD
1−λ). (23)
12As discussed in the next section, we use r
j
t as weights in the empirical application of the model.












t (M)+β(1 − λ)ηwi
t +









t) − β(1 − λ)δai
t +( 1− β)πi
t (M). (24)
Equation (24) describes πi
t(T) as a function of foreign inﬂation rates, nominal depreciation, foreign
and domestic wage-inﬂation rates, productivity growth, trade openness (bilateral and global) and
labour market integration. It contains terms from both the supply-side direct and indirect eﬀects.
Assume that inﬂation of nontradable goods, π
j
t(N), is determined by a traditional Keynesian trade-













To obtain an expression for CPI inﬂation, ﬁr s ta s s u m et h a twi










then insert (26) into (24), combine the above result with (25) and place into (1), and add the
demand and supply shocks in (18) and (20), respectively. The result is:
πi
















































































where εt = εD
t + εS
t + εw
t . Reduced-form parameters can be expressed as functions of structural
parameters as follows:
13This assumption, while not innocuous, is particularly important in the econometric analysis. It eliminates





12ϕ0 =( 1− α)φ0 + kD
0 + kS
0 + αβ(1 − λ)ηkw
0
ϕπ




n =( 1− α)φy
n
ϕw
n = αβ(1 − λ)ηkw
n
ϕa




n,f o rn ≥ 1
Ψ1 = α(1 − β)
Ψ2 = αβλζ
Ψ3 = αβλγ
Ψ4 = αβ(1 − λ)(1 − η)ς
Figure 4 displays a schematic representation of the model’s structure.
     Demand-side effect (DS) Supply-side indirect effect
Supply shocks:      π
oil = f 1 (û, g
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133 The Reduced-Form Model
In this section, we present the reduced-form equation used to estimate the eﬀects of price- and
wage-setting conditions in country j on the inﬂation rate of country i, controlling for monetary






















































EPI and CHIEW summarize the supply-side direct eﬀect (SD), and the supply-side indirect
eﬀect due to the labour-cost channel
¡
SILC¢
, respectively, while MUEPI and GEPI capture the
supply-side indirect eﬀect due to the PPP channel
¡
SIPPP¢
associated with the bilateral and global
competition channels, respectively.
As discussed in section 2.1, the supply-side direct eﬀect captures the eﬀect that the prices of
imported goods have on the domestic consumption basket. Data on the actual price level of
tradables on a cross-country basis is usually not available. Price indices must be used instead.
However, cross-country diﬀerences in the long-run equilibrium level of prices of a particular good,
rather than in their growth rates, may directly aﬀect CPI inﬂa t i o ni nag i v e nc o u n t r y .
To account for this measurement eﬀect, let HP(x) be the long-run equilibrium value of nonstation-






























as a measure of the relative price level of tradable goods from its long-run equilibrium, adjusted by
the import-penetration measure, θ
ij
t . 14
Finally, in order to take equation (27) to the data, we need to control for the eﬀects of monetary
policy. We propose two control-variables. First, following the insights in de Resende (2007), we






t (T),a n di n ﬂation
in country i, using the ratio between price indices instead of that between price levels still produces the right sign for
the estimated coeﬃcient. However, there is a scaling issue, since indices are one type of normalization of price levels.
If the ratio between price levels is scaled up by the use of price indices, then the (absolute) value of the estimated
coeﬃcient would be scaled down accordingly. The extra layer of normalization introduced by the HP ﬁlter is needed







¢−1 as a time-varying proxy for central bank independence and monetary











The higher the proportion of government spending that is ﬁnanced with seigniorage revenue, the
less credible the monetary authority will be in attempting to control inﬂation. Second, to control
for the widespread adoption of inﬂation-targeting regimes implemented by a number of countries
since the early 1990s, we use the binary variable, ITi
t, which takes the value of 1 if country i is an
inﬂation-targeter at time t,o r0 otherwise.
The empirical counterpart of equation (27) is as follows:16
πi
























































t + εt, (33)
where L
i,Chn
t refers to the deﬁnition (32) computed for the pair of countries i and China.
4 Estimation Results
In this section, we present the estimation results of both country-speciﬁc and panel versions of
equation (33) for a selection of eighteen OECD countries.17 For the construction of the relevant
time-series, we use quarterly data from the IMF, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), and
the OECD covering the 1980Q1−2006Q4 period for the following twenty-ﬁve countries: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Hong Kong, In-
donesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.18 All variables used in the
regressions are found to be stationary according to Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. In the case of
πi
t and wi
t, whenever a unit root is found, we use the deviations from a trend obtained from the
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothness parameter of 1600. Additional details regarding the data
are discussed in the Appendix.
15Resende (2007) suggests that central bank independence is negatively related to the proportion of the (intertem-
poral) government budget that is ﬁnanced by money creation.
16Given our interest in measuring the eﬀect of China on π
i
t,t h ev a r i a b l eL
ij
t was only computed for j = China.
17Due to country-speciﬁc data availability issues over the 1984-2006 period, unbalanced panel estimation with ﬁxed
eﬀects is used.
18Although equation (33) is estimated only for eighteen OECD countries, the right-hand side variables e ut, EPIt,
MUEPIt, GEPIt,a n dCHIEWt are computed using information from all twenty-ﬁve countries in the sample. See
the Appendix for details.
15In the estimations of equation (33), we discard contemporaneous values of right-hand-side variables
that may cause endogeneity problems, in the form of feedback eﬀects from πi
t to regressors that are
simultaneously determined.19 For each of the nineteen regressions (eighteen country-speciﬁca n do n e
panel regression), the lag structure in the dynamic speciﬁcation is optimally selected according to a
two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst step, based on the minimization of the Akaike Information Criterion,
we consider values between 0 and 4 to select, among all possible combinations, the truncation values
Nπ, Nyu, Nwa, Ns, N0, N1, N2, N3, N4,a n dN5. In the second step, we sequentially eliminate
the variables for which the estimated parameters are not statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent
level, starting with the least signiﬁcant.
The estimation results, using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator, are reported in Tables
2(a) and 2(b). With the exception of the constant and the binary variable ITi
t,t h ee s t i m a t e d
coeﬃcients associated with all regressors in equation (33), refer to the sum of coeﬃcients for all
lags that remain in the optimal speciﬁcation following the two-step procedure described above.
Accordingly, the p−values (in brackets) refer to the test of the null hypothesis that the sum of
coeﬃcients is zero.20 For example, the reported coeﬃcient associated with lagged inﬂation for the
case of Australia corresponds to
PNπ
n=0 b ϕπ
n =0 .1638,w h e r eb ϕπ
n is the OLS estimator for ϕπ
n.I n
this case, the coeﬃcient (sum) is found to be signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per cent level. For simplicity,
in the rest of the paper unless stated otherwise, the terms “estimated parameter” or “estimated
coeﬃcient” will refer to the sum of the estimated parameters on the explanatory variables as
presented in Tables 2(a) and 2(b).
The ﬁrst seven rows of Tables 2(a) and 2(b) correspond to the variables usually considered in empir-
ical estimations of the traditional Phillips curve augmented with unit labour costs and commodity
price inﬂation. The estimated coeﬃcients are of the expected signs in the panel regression and in
most of the country-speciﬁc regressions, as shown in the last column of Table 2(b). For example,
in the case of the domestic output gap, considering only the cases in which this variable remains in
the optimal speciﬁcation, the associated estimated coeﬃcients are positive in ﬁfteen out of sixteen
regressions, and statistically signiﬁcant at less than the ﬁve per cent level in fourteen of them. In
the case of lagged wage-inﬂation, positive and statistically signiﬁcant parameters are found in all
thirteen regressions for which this variable is part of the ﬁnal speciﬁcation. Results are also in ac-
cordance with our priors in the case of productivity growth (eight out of nine regressions), despite
the fact that the sum of estimated parameters is unexpectedly positive for Switzerland, although
19A Generalized Method of Moments estimator was also used to account for endogeneity. However, potential
colinearity problems − mainly due to the deﬁnitions of composite variables EPI, CHIEW, MUEPI,a n dGEPI
− made it very diﬃcult to ﬁnd good instruments. Very often the J−statistic did not allow us to validate the
overidentifying restrictions needed when there are more instruments than parameters to estimate. See Newey and
West (1987).
20Consistent with robust-standard-errors. See Hayashi (2000).
16not statistically signiﬁcant.
Also notice that oil price inﬂation does not have the expected positive eﬀect on inﬂa t i o ni nA u s t r a l i a ,
Austria, Japan, The Netherlands, Portugal, and the U.K. − for which the variable is not even in
the optimal speciﬁcation − as well as in Norway and Spain, for which unexpected negative signs
are found. Positive and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are obtained in the remaining eleven
regressions. In the case of coeﬃcients associated with the non-oil commodity price inﬂation, all
but four regressions display the expected positive sign. However, only two regressions display an
unexpected negative and statistically signiﬁcant (ﬁve per cent) coeﬃcient.
Dependent Variable: π
i
Variable Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Japan
Constant 0.0686 0.0006 0.0128 0.0256 0.0251 0.0104 0.0060 -0.0179 0.0070 0.0000
[0.03] [0.88] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.98]
π
i
t-n 0.1638 -0.4073 0.2399 0.1896 -0.3956 0.6549 -0.2890 0.5134 -0.3530
[0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
y
i 0.2692 0.0743 0.1636 0.0643 0.1359 0.0509 0.1633 0.1931
[0.00] [0.15] [0.00] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
w
i
t-n 0.3309 0.4520 0.2684 0.1281 0.8022
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03 [0.00]
a
i -0.9129 -0.2102 -0.3769 -0.1746 -0.1050 -0.0169
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.09] [0.60]
π
oil 0.0124 0.0167 0.0632 0.0123 0.0101 0.0057 0.0081
[0.00] [0.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02]
π
com 0.0440 0.0121 -0.0126
[0.00] [0.39] [0.09]
 EPI
i  -0.1911 0.1940 0.3224 0.2746 0.7583 0.4402 0.1321 0.2647 0.1706
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.02] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00]
L
i,Chn -0.1930 -0.0095 -0.0494 -0.5316 0.1107 0.3291 -0.0857 0.0130 0.0561
[0.03] [0.88] [0.71] [0.02] [0.09] [0.00] [0.12] [0.85] [0.00]
MUEPI
i -1.0133 -0.4214 -0.8353 0.4025
[0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00]
GEPI
i -0.8195 -1.0518 -1.2845 -0.7050 -0.4353 -0.5275 -0.2575
[0.01] [0.00] [0.08] [0.01] [0.01] [0.04] [0.00]
CHIEW
i 0.4658 0.2320 -0.0462 -0.0898 -0.1032
[0.00] [0.00] [0.52] [0.06] [0.01]
û 0.1739 -0.1720 -0.1413 -0.1782 -0.1611 0.0285
[0.20] [0.00] [0.01] [0.02] [0.00] [0.63]
CBI
i -0.0532 0.0041 -0.0122 0.0054 -0.0028 -0.0385 -0.0071 0.0015
[0.05] [0.57] [0.01] [0.00] [0.01] [0.04] [0.00] [0.78]
IT
i -0.0031 -0.0105 -0.0013
[0.01] [0.00] [0.02]
Adj R





Variable Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland U.K. U.S. Panel  Right Sign
Constant 0.0091 0.0040 0.0176 0.0035 0.0061 0.0010 0.0597 0.0587 0.0013 18/19
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.13] [0.00] [0.00] [0.20]
π
i
t-k 0.5809 0.4599 -0.2269 0.1480 0.4289 9/14
[0.00] [0.00] [0.14] [0.04] [0.00]
y
i 0.0907 0.1634 0.0851 -0.2261 0.1209 0.1204 0.0563 0.0400 15/16
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
w
i
t-n 0.2185 0.3435 0.0675 0.2143 0.9617 0.3861 0.3885 0.3896 13/13
[0.00] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
a
i -0.6431 0.0175 -0.0507 8/9
[0.00] [0.72] [0.00]
π
oil -0.0108 -0.0052 0.0237 0.0285 0.0270 0.0061 11/13
[0.0937] [0.03] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
π
com -0.0192 0.0424 -0.0006 -0.0054 -0.0297 -0.0117 0.0115 4/10
[0.07] [0.00] [0.96] [0.54] [0.01] [0.05] [0.01]
 EPI
i  0.3645 0.4570 1.1594 0.0539 -0.5501 0.0133 13/15
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.0030] [0.00] [0.01]
L
i,Chn -0.7813 -0.2291 -0.0240 -0.0031 9 (-) , 4 (+)
[0.02] [0.01] [0.68] [0.36]
MUEPI
i -0.4682 1.1865 -0.5938 0.2171 1.4524 1.9167 0.0645 5 (-) , 6 (+)
[0.44] [0.01] [0.06] [0.10] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
GEPI
i -1.2647 -1.8052 -3.8725 -1.2649 -1.0726 -0.2291 13 (-) , 0 (+)
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05]
CHIEW
i 0.3128 0.0555 -0.0612 0.0615 4 (-) , 5 (+)
[0.01] [0.00] [0.33] [0.00]
û 0.0257 0.2502 0.3674 -0.2296 5/10
[0.79] [0.02] [0.00] [0.01]
CBI
i -0.0072 -0.0166 -0.0473 -0.0494 -0.0440 -0.0001 11/14
[0.05] [0.00] [0.08] [0.00] [0.00] [0.86]
IT
i 0.0016 -0.0030 -0.0038 -0.0028 -0.0007 7/8
[0.04] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05]
Adj R
2 0.32 0.60 0.51 0.60 0.68 0.77 0.64 0.70 0.78
Table 2(b)
Estimation Results (cont.)
Rows eight to twelve in Tables 2(a) and 2(b) show the estimated coeﬃcients for the variables
that capture the supply-side direct (EPI and Li,Chn) and indirect eﬀects (CHIEW, MUEPI,
and GEPI). Taking into account movements in the weighted average bilateral exchange rate, the
model predicts a positive association between foreign tradable goods inﬂation and domestic CPI
inﬂation. In terms of equation (33), the implication for the estimated parameter associated with
EPI is that
PN0
n=1 b ψ0,t−n > 0.A m o n gt h eﬁf t e e nr e g r e s s i o n si nw h i c hEPI is part of the optimal
speciﬁcation, results are consistent with the model’s prediction in the panel regression as well as in
all countries, with the exception of Australia and the United Kingdom.
The composite variable, Li,Chn, introduced to account for diﬀerences in the absolute price level of
tradable goods between country i and China, while taking into account the import penetration of
Chinese goods, has an ambiguous eﬀect on πi
t.A c c o r d i n gt od e ﬁnition (32), changes in Li,Chn may
18come from two sources (in deviations from their long-run trends): 1) the share of imports from
China in total imports of country i,a sm e a s u r e db yθi,Chn, and 2) the relative price of Chinese
goods measured in units of country’s i currency. On the one hand, to the extent that Chinese
goods are cheaper, increases in θi,Chn should exert downward pressure on the prices of tradable
goods in country i and, as a consequence, reduce πi. On the other hand, for a given θi,Chn,
higher Chinese prices should have a positive impact on πi. The sign of the estimated parameter
PN1
n=1 b ψ1,t−n, associated with Li,Chn, should reﬂect the relative importance of these two opposite
forces. As shown in Tables 2(a) and 2(b),
PN1
n=1 b ψ1,t−n is statistically signiﬁcant in eight out of
thirteen regressions for which this variable stays in the ﬁnal speciﬁcation of (33), being negative in




n=1 b ψ2,t−n, associated with the composite variable MUEPI that cap-
tures the contribution of bilateral trade openness to the supply-side indirect eﬀect due to the PPP
channel, has also an ambiguous expected sign. Recall that MUEPI is constructed from interact-
ing foreign tradable goods inﬂation measured in domestic currency (i.e., taking into account the
bilateral exchange rate) with the degree of bilateral trade openness, µ
ij
t . While foreign inﬂation
should have a positive impact on πi, increasing trade openness should produce the opposite eﬀect.
Note that the estimated coeﬃcient is found to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant in ﬁve coun-
tries (Germany, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and in the panel
regression, while it is negative and signiﬁcant in four others (Australia, Canada, Denmark, and
Sweden).
The other variable that reﬂects the supply-side indirect eﬀect due to the PPP channel is GEPI,
which is obtained from the interaction between Gt, our measure of globalization deﬁned in (9), and
EPI. Similarly to MUEPI,t h ee ﬀect of GEPI on πi is expected to be ambiguous. Again, other
things being equal, higher foreign inﬂation implies a higher level of πi, while the acceleration in
the process of integration of national markets for goods should reduce πi. However, as displayed in
Tables 2(a) and 2(b), the estimated parameter
PN3
n=1 b ψ3,t−n is found to be negative and statistically
signiﬁcant for all thirteen regressions for which GEPI belongs to the optimal speciﬁcation. This
result suggests an important downward pressure coming from increased globalization to domestic
CPI inﬂation, and is consistent with the ﬁndings recently reported by Borio and Filardo (2007).
The supply-side indirect eﬀect due to the labour-cost channel is captured by CHIEW,w h i c h
encompasses the combined eﬀects of foreign wage-inﬂation and the degree of (bilateral) job mar-
ket integration as measured by χ
ij
t . As in the composite variables discussed above, CHIEW
should have a positive, or negative, eﬀect on πi depending on whether the eﬀect of foreign wage-
inﬂation dominates, or is dominated by that of job market integration. The estimated parameter
19PN4
n=1 b ψ4,t−n is found to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant in four countries (Australia, Aus-
tria, Portugal, and Spain) and in the panel regression. It is negative in the other four countries,
but statistically signiﬁcant in only two cases (Italy and Japan).
Along with oil and non-oil price inﬂation, our measure of global slackness is important for the
demand-side eﬀect. According to Tables 2(a) and 2(b), this variable is not a part of the ﬁnal
speciﬁcation of (33) in nine regressions, including the panel estimation. Among the remaining ten
country-speciﬁc regressions, the parameter
PNyu
n=0 ρu
n, associated with our measure of world output
gap, b ut−n, is positive, as expected, in only half of them. Only in Portugal and Sweden are the
positive coeﬃcients also statistically signiﬁcant. These results are in line with both Ball (2006) and
Ihrig et al. (2007), but contradict Borio and Filardo’s (2007) “globe-centric” approach to estimated
Phillips curves.
The coeﬃcients associated with the two control-variables, CBIi and ITi − that account for the
anti-inﬂation stance derived from central bank independence, and the presence of explicit inﬂation-
targeting frameworks, respectively − generally display the expected sign whenever those variables
are found to remain in equation (33)’s ﬁnal speciﬁcation. Note that in eleven out of fourteen
regressions, CBIi has the expected negative impact on πi, although it is not statistically signiﬁcant
in the panel speciﬁcation. Additionally, out of ﬁfteen inﬂation-targeting countries considered,
ITi is found to be relevant in seven and, among them, the associated estimated parameter is
negative, as expected, and statistically signiﬁcant, at the ﬁve per cent level in six countries (Canada,
Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). ITi is also negative and signiﬁcant in the panel
regression.
Given that some of the unexpected sign reversals observed in estimated coeﬃcients from country-
speciﬁc regressions may be, in part, caused by small-sample problems, we interpreted the results
from the panel estimation as providing further evidence that the model explains the data well.21 The
additional degrees of freedom aﬀorded by combining the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions
in a pooled regression yield more eﬃcient estimated parameters and help reduce small-sample
bias in statistical inference. Unlike the estimation results for some individual countries, the panel
estimation results are consistent with our priors and, for the most part, are statistically signiﬁcant
at less than the ﬁve per cent level. Notice that the results of the panel estimation, displayed in
the last column of Table 2(b), indicate that out of fourteen variables considered in the estimation
of (33), only b ut is not present in the optimal speciﬁcation. In addition, the estimated coeﬃcients
associated with all remaining variables are of the expected sign and, with the exception of Li,Chn
and CBIi
t, statistically signiﬁcant.
21For instance, the adjusted R
2 (= 0.78) in the panel estimation suggests that the regressors derived from the
theoretical model have a high explanatory power over the variance of CPI inﬂation.
205 The Role of China
This section computes the time-varying eﬀect of price- and wage-setting conditions in China on
the CPI inﬂation rate of eighteen OECD countries, using the estimation results reported in the
previous section. For each of the four channels discussed in Section 2, we compute the eﬀects using
a counterfactual exercise as follows.22
Counterfactual values of the regressors are computed under the assumption that both China’s
importance in the world economy (as a producer and exporter of goods) and its bilateral economic
integration with the other countries in the sample are kept constant at a reference date. More
speciﬁcally, the following steps are used:
1) We ﬁrst create counterfactual values for the relevant variables associated with each particular






t ,a n drChn
t a r eh e l dc o n s t a n ta ta t
their 1990Q1 values.23 For instance:















• We compute counterfactual values for Gt,u s i n grChn
t = rChn
1990Q1, and multiply the result by
the counterfactual EPI discussed above in order to obtain counterfactual values for GEPI.
• We also freeze rChn
t = rChn
1990Q1to generate counterfactual values for the world output gap,
b ut, and for the growth rate of the world economy, g∗
t.24 These values are then used in




2) Using the estimated coeﬃcients and the residuals, b εt, from the country-speciﬁcv e r s i o n so f
equation (33), along with the counterfactual variables, we construct counterfactual values for CPI
22One could also try to identify the eﬀect of China on country’s j inﬂation using the total diﬀerentiation of equation
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com,a n de u, for all relevant lags in the optimal speciﬁcation. The eﬀects according to such
“total diﬀerential approach” (available upon request) are not statistically diﬀerent from zero, mainly due to the use
of mean reverting, stationary regressors in the estimation of (33). This means that shocks to the right-hand side
variables only have temporary, and not very persistent, eﬀects on the dependent variable π
i
t, biasing the average
eﬀects towards zero.
23Later in the paper, we do a sensitivity analysis for Canada to show how the estimated eﬀects change with diﬀerent
reference dates.
24Note that freezing the share of China in world GDP as that observed in 1990Q1 to generate the counterfactual
value of g
∗











t (DS) be the counterfactual inﬂation rates asso-
ciated with the supply-side direct, supply-side indirect−PPP, supply-side indirect−labour channel,
and demand−side eﬀects, respectively. We compute πi
t (SD) by replacing the actual time-series









is obtained by using the counterfactual CHIEW,
and πi
t (DS) requires counterfactual values for b ut, πoil
t and πcom
t .
3) We then compute country-speciﬁc time-varying eﬀects of China using et = πi
t − πi
t (e),a s
the diﬀerence between actual and counterfactual inﬂation rates, for e=S D , SIPPP, SILC,a n dDS.
The total eﬀect is the sum of the eﬀects coming from the four channels.
Country π SD SI
PPP SI
LC
DS Total Only Significant
Australia 2.62 -0.6979 -0.0220 0.3023 -0.0134 -0.4311 -0.3957
[0.00] [0.56] [0.00] [0.64] [-0.5973, -0.2348]
Austria 2.17 -0.0722 -0.1031 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1754 -0.1754
[0.10] [0.00] [1.00] [1.00] [-0.2786, -0.0721]
Belgium 2.06 -0.0005 -0.1884 0.0000 -0.0050 -0.1939 -0.1884
[0.99] [0.02] [1.00] [0.85] [-0.3513, -0.0365] 
Canada 2.15 -0.3373 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.3417 -0.3373
[0.00] [0.86] [1.00] [0.92] [-0.4343, -0.2492]
Denmark 2.02 0.0041 -0.0301 0.0000 -0.0052 -0.0311 0.0000
[0.71] [0.33] [1.00] [0.94] [-0.1705, 0.1084]
Finland 1.79 0.2873 -0.2075 -0.0094 -0.0179 0.0525 0.0798
[0.00] [0.06] [0.56] [0.50] [-0.1913, 0.2963]
France 1.77 -0.0602 -0.1129 0.0000 -0.0040 -0.1772 -0.1731
[0.04] [0.00] [1.00] [0.85] [-0.2633, -0.0910]
Germany 2.10 -0.0042 -0.0113 0.0000 0.0026 -0.0128 0.0000
[0.91] [0.91] [1.00] [0.85] [-0.2073, 0.1817]
Italy 3.23 0.0021 -0.0784 -0.0153 -0.0031 -0.0947 -0.0937
[0.36] [0.04] [0.00] [0.88] [-0.1795, -0.0099]
Japan 0.47 0.1513 -0.0761 -0.1157 0.0010 -0.0395 -0.0405
[0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.50] [-0.1901, 0.1111]
Netherlands 2.32 0.0059 -0.1757 0.0000 0.0027 -0.1672 -0.1757
[0.72] [0.07] [1.00] [0.81] [-0.3298, -0.0045]
Norway 2.11 0.0022 -0.0640 0.0000 0.0137 -0.0481 0.0000
[0.76] [0.23] [1.00] 0.7700 [-0.1663, 0.0701]
Portugal 4.40 0.0047 -0.0982 0.0141 0.0013 -0.0781 -0.0841
[0.55] [0.01] [0.00] [0.87] [-0.1449, -0.0113]
Spain 3.59 0.0000 -0.0274 0.0084 0.0017 -0.0173 -0.0190
[1.00] [0.11] [0.00] [0.88] [-0.0554, 0.0209]
Sweden 2.30 -0.2070 -0.0084 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.2172 -0.2070
[0.00] [0.53] [1.00] [0.97] [-0.3817, -0.0527]
Switzerland 1.59 0.0000 0.0028 -0.0070 -0.0205 -0.0247 0.0000
[1.00] [0.65] [0.34] [0.56] [-0.0936, 0.0443]
U.K. 2.46 -0.0019 0.0060 0.0000 0.0063 0.0105 0.0000
[0.67] [0.67] [1.00] [0.71] [-0.0259, 0.0468]
U.S. 2.79 -0.0305 -0.0361 0.0000 -0.0174 -0.0839 -0.0666
[0.13] [0.08] 1.0000 [0.56] [-0.1687, 0.0009]
Average 2.33 -0.0530 -0.0685 0.0099 -0.0034 -0.1150 -0.1042
Note: Confidence intervals in the last column refer to the 10% significance level.
Table 3
Percentage Points Per Year (1990 - 2006)
Estimated Average Effect of China
22Results for the 1990Q1-2006Q4 period, expressed in percentage points per year (p.p./year), are







t ,a n drChn
t since 1990Q1 are estimated to have reduced CPI inﬂa t i o ni ns i x t e e n
out of the eighteen countries considered. The two exceptions are Finland and the U.K, although
the positive values are not statistically signiﬁcant. The expected negative average value for the
total “China-eﬀect” is statistically diﬀerent from zero for Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
France, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Among these countries, the largest average
total eﬀect is that estimated for Australia (-0.43 p.p./year), and the smallest for Portugal (-0.08
p.p./year). The average estimate for Canada falls in between (-0.34 p.p./year).
Second, note that in several countries for which the total eﬀect is not found to be statistically
signiﬁcant, estimates of some individual channels are.26 This is the case for Finland, Japan, Spain,
and the United States. For example, the supply-side indirect eﬀect for the United States is estimated
to be about -0.04 of a percentage point, although the estimated total eﬀect (-0.08 p.p./year) is
marginally insigniﬁcant at the ten per cent level. For the United States, the supply-side direct
eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 13 per cent level. These results for the U.S. are in line with
previous ﬁndings by Kamin, Marazzi, and Schindler (2006).
Third, we ﬁnd that the supply-side direct eﬀect is smaller than the supply-side indirect eﬀect, on
average. Amongst the two components of the supply-side indirect eﬀect, the PPP channel appears,
on average, to be more important than the labour-cost channel as a source of downward pressure
on global inﬂation.
Fourth, the demand-side eﬀect does not seem to have contributed to increasing the inﬂation rate in
the countries examined. The average estimate is not statistically signiﬁcant for any of the countries
in the sample. This result is at odds with the widespread opinion (for example, IMF 2007, pp.
40-47), usually based on simple descriptive statistics of cross-country shares on the incremental
world demand for oil and non-oil commodities, that China is a major factor in explaining the price
changes in these markets.
25We also compute the eﬀects of China on the CPI inﬂation of other countries in the sample using the estimated
coeﬃcients from the panel speciﬁcation of equation (33). Unlike the results obtained using the county-speciﬁc
regressions (see Table 3), that exercise implies negligible country-speciﬁce ﬀects (available from the authors upon
request). The main reason for this is that our panel estimation (pooled regression) imposes homogeneous parameters
across countries. As shown in Table 2(b), country-speciﬁc regressions produce several estimated parameters found to
be zero, which explains why their counterparts in the panel regression are much lower in absolute values. These results
suggest that parameter homogeneity may be an unreasonable restriction and that the sensitivity of CPI inﬂation to
the right-hand-side variables displays important cross-country heterogeneity.
26This is possible because we ﬁrst obtain a time-series of the total eﬀect by adding the values of the four eﬀects,
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Figure 5
Figure 5 displays the actual and counterfactual oil and non-oil price inﬂation computed from the
estimation of equations (21) and (22). Note that our methodology is unable to clearly identify
a positive eﬀect of China on oil-price inﬂation. Although the diﬀerence between the actual and
counterfactual inﬂation rates of oil prices (upper-right chart) reaches two-digit ﬁgures in absolute
value in several instances, the average and median values are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. On
the other hand, in the case of non-oil commodity price inﬂation, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that the median eﬀect of China is positive. In addition, the average is clearly positive for the
2000−2006 period, in accordance with the priors of practitioners and in line with the anecdotal
evidence. When the counterfactual oil and non-oil price inﬂa t i o nr a t e sa r eu s e di nt h ec o u n t r y -
speciﬁc counterfactual inﬂation, the small measurable eﬀect of China on world markets combined
with the estimated coeﬃcients for πoil
t and πcom
t in equation (33) produces an average demand-side
eﬀect that is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.
This result may be explained by the fact that the oil and non-oil commodity price inﬂation rates are
24too volatile due to the hybrid nature of commodities as both goods and assets. The regressors in
the estimation of equations (21) and (22) have low explanatory power.27 In addition, the presence
of China as a major player in world commodity markets is a relatively recent phenomena and econo-
metric models still have diﬃculties in identifying it due to an insuﬃcient number of observations.
Future research is needed to address this point.




Australia 1990 - 2006 2.62 -0.70 -0.02 0.30 -0.01 -0.43
2001 - 2006 2.74 -0.91 -0.01 0.52 0.08 -0.33
Austria 1990 - 2006 2.17 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.18
2001 - 2006 1.75 -0.11 -0.20 0.00 0.00 -0.31
Belgium 1990 - 2006 2.06 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.19
2001 - 2006 1.95 -0.04 -0.25 0.00 -0.01 -0.30
Canada 1990 - 2006 2.15 -0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.34
2001 - 2006 2.11 -0.32 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.32
Denmark 1990 - 2006 2.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.03
2001 - 2006 1.90 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.07
Finland 1990 - 2006 1.79 0.29 -0.21 -0.01 -0.02 0.05
2001 - 2006 1.19 0.32 -0.27 -0.02 0.00 0.04
France 1990 - 2006 1.77 -0.06 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.18
2001 - 2006 1.74 -0.06 -0.17 0.00 -0.01 -0.25
Germany 1990 - 2006 2.10 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
2001 - 2006 1.56 -0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.03
Italy 1990 - 2006 3.23 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.09
2001 - 2006 2.20 0.00 -0.12 -0.02 0.00 -0.14
Japan 1990 - 2006 0.47 0.15 -0.08 -0.12 0.00 -0.04
2001 - 2006 -0.29 0.22 -0.23 -0.25 0.00 -0.26
Netherlands 1990 - 2006 2.32 0.01 -0.18 0.00 0.00 -0.17
2001 - 2006 2.12 -0.01 -0.16 0.00 -0.05 -0.22
Norway 1990 - 2006 2.11 0.00 -0.06 0.00 0.01 -0.05
2001 - 2006 1.51 -0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.16 0.08
Portugal 1990 - 2006 4.40 0.00 -0.10 0.01 0.00 -0.08
2001 - 2006 2.78 0.00 -0.16 0.02 0.00 -0.14
Spain 1990 - 2006 3.59 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02
2001 - 2006 2.94 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.03
Sweden 1990 - 2006 2.30 -0.21 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.22
2001 - 2006 1.36 -0.17 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.19
Switzerland 1990 - 2006 1.59 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
2001 - 2006 0.66 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.08
U.K. 1990 - 2006 2.46 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
2001 - 2006 1.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.07
U.S. 1990 - 2006 2.79 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.08
2001 - 2006 2.52 -0.04 -0.14 0.00 -0.06 -0.25
Percentage Points Per Year
Table 4
Estimated Average Effect of China
Although the total eﬀect of China on the inﬂation rates of other countries has been quantitatively
modest, it has increased in absolute terms since the early 2000s. As reported in Table 4, the average
estimates for the total eﬀect have increased over the 2001-2006 period, compared with the entire
1990-2006 period, for thirteen of the eighteen countries examined. This suggests that the eﬀect is
27The adjusted R
2 are 0.23 and 0.47, respectively.
25getting stronger as China continuously deepens its trade relations and increases its share in world





1990 - 2006 -0.0079 -0.0488 -0.0179 -0.0073 -0.0818
2001 - 2006 -0.0120 -0.1179 -0.0387 -0.0372 -0.2058
Only significant effects
1990 - 2006 -0.0076 -0.0478 -0.0177 0.0000 -0.0731
2001 - 2006 -0.0070 -0.1231 -0.0384 0.0000 -0.1686
Effect of China on Global Inflation
Table 5
 Percentage Points Per Year
The eﬀect of China on global inﬂation based on the Counterfactual Approach is presented in Table
5. Results for each channel are computed as the cross-country weighted average of the same time-
series used to construct Tables 3 and 4. The time-varying country-speciﬁc shares in world real
GDP are used as weights. In the upper panel of Table 5, we show the eﬀect of China on global
inﬂation computed from all country-speciﬁce ﬀects. In the lower panel, the eﬀect on global inﬂation
is computed only with country-speciﬁce ﬀects found to be statistically signiﬁcant at the ten per cent
level. Focusing on these results, the eﬀect of China is estimated to have reduced global inﬂation by
about -0.07 of a percentage point over the 1990-2006 period, and by -0.17 of a percentage point,
on average, from 2001 to 2006. Moreover, the supply-side indirect eﬀect is estimated to have been
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Effect of China on CPI Inflation vs Imports from + Exports to China
Figure 6
28Although collinearity between explanatory variables associated with each channel does not bias the estimated
coeﬃcients in (33), it makes identiﬁcation more diﬃcult and may play a role in determining which channel seems to
matter most. For instance, there is a possibility that the supply-side direct eﬀect also captures some of the indirect
eﬀects, and vice-versa.
26In order to assess the relevance of China’s bilateral trade relations in the estimated eﬀects on
the CPI inﬂation of other countries, Figure 6 plots the country-speciﬁcs u mo ft h ea v e r a g ee ﬀects
(over the sample period) coming from the supply-side direct and indirect eﬀects against bilateral
trade ﬂows with China as a percentage of the GDP. Note the negative slope of the regression line,
indicating that stronger eﬀects (more negative values) coming from China to domestic CPI inﬂation
are associated with higher levels of bilateral trade ﬂows.




1985Q1 1985 - 2006 -0.4638 -0.0016 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.4657
1990 - 2006 -0.4598 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.4642
2001 - 2006 -0.4438 0.0085 0.0000 -0.0062 -0.4415
1990Q1 1990 - 2006 -0.3373 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.3417
2001 - 2006 -0.3212 0.0085 0.0000 -0.0062 -0.3189
2001Q1 2001 - 2006 -0.2762 0.0085 0.0000 -0.0062 -0.2739
 Percentage Points Per Year
Canada: Sensitivity to the Reference Period
Table 6
Admittedly, the estimated China eﬀect based on the “Counterfactual” approach may be sensitive







t ,a n drChn
t are held constant. To assess the sensitivity of our main results, we re-calculate
the total eﬀect of China on Canadian CPI inﬂation using diﬀerent reference periods. Results are
presented in Table 6. In the ﬁrst and third panels, the shares are held constant at their 1985Q1
and 2001Q1 values, respectively. For convenience, in the second panel, we repeat the estimated
eﬀects for Canada as reported in Table 3 (shares at their 1990Q1 values). Overall, when we use
1990Q1 instead of 1985Q1 as the reference period, the estimated eﬀect of China on the Canadian
CPI inﬂation over the 2001-2006 period is reduced from -0.44 to -0.32 of a percentage point per
year. The total eﬀect is further reduced from -0.32 to -0.27 percentage points per year when 2001Q1
is used as the reference period. The associated standard errors (not shown in Table 6) imply that
the total eﬀect remains statistically signiﬁcant at the ten per cent level regardless of the reference
period. Moreover, for Canada, the earlier the reference period, the larger is the estimated eﬀect of
China − approximately 0.1 p.p./year higher per decade. These results conﬁrm that the estimated
eﬀects based on the Counterfactual Approach are sensitive to the choice of the reference period,
should be taken with caution and interpreted not as an absolute measurement of the eﬀect of China
on other countries’ inﬂation rates. The results must be understood as conditional to the reference
period. Also note that after accounting for diﬀerences in methodology, our results for Canada are
consistent with those reported in Morel (2007).29
29More speciﬁcally, we use the share of imports from China on total imports, θ
i,Chn
t ,t od e ﬁne the supply-side
276C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have developed a structural model to estimate the eﬀects of price- and wage-
setting conditions in country j on the inﬂation rate of country i. Although our methodology is
general enough to be applied to any pair of countries, the paper focuses on the eﬀect of China on
the inﬂation rate of other countries. With the proposed structural model, we identify and quantify
four channels through which globalizationi ng e n e r a l ,a n dC h i n ai np a r t i c u l a r ,m a ya ﬀect inﬂation
in a given country: 1) the supply-side direct eﬀect, based on the direct eﬀect of presumably cheaper
goods imported from China on a country’s consumption basket; 2) two supply-side indirect eﬀects,
that capture the impact of increasing competitive pressures coming from (i) Chinese goods (the
PPP channel) and (ii) Chinese wages (the labour-cost channel); and 3) the demand-side eﬀect,t h a t
measures the eﬀect of Chinese economic slackness and growth on domestic aggregate demand and
w o r l do i la n dn o n - o i lc o m m o d i t yp r i c ei n ﬂation.
We use quarterly data from twenty-ﬁve countries over the 1984—2006 period to estimate a dynamic
inﬂation equation derived from the structural model. Both country-speciﬁca n dﬁxed-eﬀect panel
regressions are estimated. Based on the estimated coeﬃcients from the country-speciﬁcr e g r e s s i o n s ,
we compute the time-varying eﬀect of China on the CPI inﬂation of other countries using a coun-
terfactual exercise in which we compare the actual inﬂation rates with a counterfactual measure
of inﬂation calculated under the assumption that both China’s share in the world economy and
its bilateral economic integration with other economies are held constant at their 1990Q1 values.
Sensitivity of the results to diﬀerent reference dates is presented for the case of Canada.
Results suggest that increased economic integration and economic growth from China since 1990Q1
have reduced CPI inﬂation in thirteen of the eighteen countries considered. Price- and wage-setting
conditions in China are estimated to have reduced global inﬂation by about -0.07 of a percentage
point per year over the 1990-2006 period, and by -0.17 of a percentage point per year from 2001
to 2006. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence that, for most countries, the supply-side indirect eﬀect due to
competition pressures through the PPP channel appears to be the most important channel. The
impact of the demand-side eﬀect on the inﬂation rate is not statistically signiﬁcant in the eighteen
countries examined.
We also detect important cross-country heterogeneity in the estimated eﬀects. For instance, the
eﬀect of China on domestic CPI inﬂation is the largest for Australia and the smallest for Portugal.
direct eﬀect, while Morel (2007) uses the share of imports from China in the CPI basket. Also, Morel (2007) does
not consider the eﬀect of relative price changes, which are held constant at their 2001 values. Both studies produce
the same 0.2 p.p/year reduction in Canadian CPI inﬂation due to the supply-side direct eﬀect when considering the
same sample (2001-2006), the same θ
i,Chn
t , and treat relative prices the same way.
28Overall, stronger negative eﬀects coming from China to domestic CPI inﬂation are associated with
higher levels of bilateral trade ﬂows. In addition, while the supply-side indirect eﬀect due to the
PPP channel is found to be, on average, the most important channel, there are important exceptions
such as Australia, Canada, and Sweden, for which the supply-side direct eﬀect dominates.
Finally, a few points should be noted regarding the direction of future research. First, our empirical
results show that panel estimation based on standard pooled regression with ﬁxed eﬀects may not
adequately capture country-speciﬁci n ﬂation dynamics. Allowing for some cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in the sensitivity of CPI inﬂation to the right-hand side variables should be an important
extension. Second, diﬀerent proxies for trade openness and economic integration (eﬀective tariﬀ
rates, for example) could provide a better measure of potential economic linkages than those based
on outcomes from trade ﬂows. Finally, a richer model structure for oil and non-oil commodity price
inﬂation may be needed.
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31Appendix: Data Description
This section provides details on the data used required for the estimation of equation (33). We
need to generate time series to represent the following variables: πi
t, ˆ yi
t, wt, at, πoil
t , πcom
t , b ut, EPIt,
L
i,Chn
t , MUEPIt, GEPIt, CHIEWt,a n dCBIi
t.
We use quarterly seasonally adjusted data from twenty-ﬁve countries that account for about sev-
enty per cent of world GDP over the period 1984 to 2006.30’31 The sample includes eighteen
developed economies that are members of the OECD − Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States − and seven emerging-market economies − Brazil,
Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, South Korea, and China.
All growth rates, including inﬂation rates, are calculated using the log-diﬀerence of the variables
in levels. Inﬂation rates πi
t, πoil
t ,a n dπcom
t are computed from the consumer prices index (series
64...ZF), West Texas Intermediate spot price index (series 11176AADZFM17), and non-fuel com-
modities prices index (series 00176NFDZF), respectively. All three series are obtained from the In-
ternational Financial Statistics dataset compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IFS/IMF).
The producer price index (PPI), also obtained from the IMF/IFS (series 63...ZF), is used as a proxy
for the price of tradable goods, pi
t(T),u s e di nt h ec o m p u t a t i o no fL
i,Chn
t a c c o r d i n gt od e ﬁnition
(32). Its growth rate, π
j
t(T), is then used to compute EPIt, MUEPIt,a n dGEPIt according to
(28)−(30).
Domestic output gap, ˆ yi
t, is calculated as the percentage deviation of the GDP at constant prices
(IMF/IFS series 99BVPZF), expressed in the logarithmic scale, from its trend. The trend is com-
puted using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with a smoothness parameter of 1600. Foreign output
gap, b ut, is then calculated as the average value of ˆ yi
t over the twenty-ﬁve countries in the sample,
as described in (19). Following deﬁnition in (10), a GDP series measured at constant prices of a
common currency unit (U.S. dollars), is used for the weights, r
j
t, required in the computation of b ut.
The wage-inﬂation rate, wt, is calculated using average wage earnings available from the IFS/IMF
(series 65...ZF), the BIS (series VNBA), or the OCDE (series LCEAIN03)32, while productivity
growth, at, is computed from the diﬀerence between the growth rates of GDP (constant prices, in
local currency) and that of employment. We considered indices of employment or hours-worked
from the IFS/IMF (series 63...ZF), the BIS (series UDBA), and the OECD (series EMESCVTT).
30We use the X-12 seasonal adjustment program provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
31U s i n gd a t ao naP P Pb a s i sf r o mt h eO E C D .





t ,a n dχ
ij
t , the globalization index, Gt,a sw e l la st h eb i l a t e r a lm e a s u r e so fn o m i n a l
exchange rate depreciation, e
ij
t , are required for the computation of the composite variables EPIt,







t ,a n dGt,a r ef r o mt h eInternational Trade Statistics dataset from the IMF (ITS/IMF). Bilateral
exchange rates, in levels, are indirectly obtained using the ratio of exchange rates of countries i and
j against the U.S. dollar (series AE...ZF). Log-diﬀerences in the level of the nominal exchange rate
are used to compute e
ij
t .
Finally, monetary base, mi
t, and government spending, gi
t − needed to generate the proxy for
central bank independency and monetary policy credibility indicator, CBIi
t − are represented
by IFS/IMF series 14 and 91...ZF, respectively.33 The inﬂation-targeting dummy variable was
constructed according to the survey by Paulin (2006). Table 7 summarizes the data description.
Table 7
Data Description
Variables Symbol Source of Raw Data
C P Ia n dP P Ii n ﬂation πi
t, πi
t (T) IFS/IMF




t IFS/IMF, BIS, OECD
productivity growth ai
t IFS/IMF, BIS, OECD
oil and non-oil commodity-price inﬂation πt (oil), πt (com) IFS/IMF
bilateral nominal exchange rates (growth) e
ij
t IFS/IMF












IT dummy ITi Paulin (2006)
33When IFS series 14 is not available, we use the sum of IFS series 14a, 14c, and 14d, which are disaggregated
liabilities of the monetary authority.
33